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The diptych made up of Le Gouvernement de soi et des autres (GSA) and Le Courage de 
la vérité (CV) pursues the avenues of thought on Greco-Roman antiquity that had 
begun to be explored particularly in The Hermeneutics of the Subject. These lectures—
the last that Foucault gave at the Collège de France—were not entirely new if one 
considers that a well-known extract taken from the inaugural lecture of GSA was 
published in 1984, in a version reworked by Foucault, entitled “What is 
Enlightenment?”1  Moreover, in 2004, Magazine littéraire published an extract from 
the February 16, 1983, session (GSA, 226-230) entitled “Un cours inédit de Michel 
Foucault.”2  Finally, in 1983, Joseph Pearson had published, under the title Fearless 
Speech,3 a series of six seminars given by Foucault at the University of California, 
Berkeley, which returned to several of the themes explored in GSA and CV. 
Foucauldian studies have also benefited from a few commentaries inspired by GSA 
and CV taken from archives at the Institut Mémoire de l’Édition Contemporaine 
                                                 
1 Michel Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?” in Paul Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 32-50. See also Michel Foucault, “Kant on Enlightenment and 
Revolution,” Economy and Society, vol. 15, no. 1 (February 1986), 88-96. These texts were reprinted 
in various books, sometimes under different titles. For a complete list of reprints see the 
bibliography prepared by Richard A. Lynch (items # 339 and 351): ‹http://www.michel-
foucault.com/bibmf/index.html›. 
2 Michel Foucault, “Un cours inédit de Michel Foucault. Vivre avec la philosophie,” Magazine 
littéraire, no. 435 (October 2004), 60-61. In his introduction to this text (p. 60), Frédéric Gros 
mistakenly indicates that this excerpt is taken from the February 23, 1983 lecture. 
3 Michel Foucault, Fearless Speech, edited by Joseph Pearson (New York: Semiotext(e), 2001). See 
also the English seminars given by Foucault in Toronto in 1982 available at IMEC (abbaye 
d’Ardenne, France) under the title “Dire-vrai sur soi-même” (code FCL.128). 
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(IMEC).4  It should be noted that these are the only two lectures whose summaries 
were not written for the Annuaire du Collège de France and which consequently do not 
appear in the published versions of GSA and CV, as was the case for the other 
lectures.  We must of course once again acknowledge the patient editing work of 
François Ewald, Alessandro Fontana and Frédéric Gros, which has given a wide 
audience access to texts that are essential to the understanding of Foucault’s work.  
 GSA and CV are permeated with ideas concerning acting in general, and the 
action of the philosopher in particular.  They offer analyses that are always 
innovative in terms of the history of ideas and which also find echoes in 
contemporary society.  GSA opens with a debate on Kant and the revolution, which 
shows that Foucault’s last lectures were not simply an exegesis of Greek thought, 
but that they also sought to show how certain ancient practices contain teachings 
that are apt to produce alternatives to the current methods of government of the self 
and of others, with the study of the technique of parrhesiastic veridiction consti-
tuting the common thread running through these analyses.   
 
Government of Self and Others 
Parrhesia, which is central to GSA (as it is to CV5), is a technique of veridiction 
consisting of “tell*ing+-everything,” truth-telling or exercising a frankness of speech 
that puts the life of the parrhesiast in danger.  In GSA, Foucault studies parrhesia in 
the context of government of the self and of others, advocating a return to several 
ancient sources, among them Socrates, Plutarch, Polybius, Thucydides and, in a 
more detailed way, Euripides and Plato.  
 Parrhesiastic frankness of speech is opposed to falsehood and flattery.  It is 
also different from the other means of truth-telling: demonstration (analysis of the 
rational structure of speech), persuasion (rhetoric), teaching (pedagogy) and 
discussion (gradual emergence of truth in dialogue); the element of risk for the 
speaker (GSA, 52-56), the public aspect (GSA, 62) and complete freedom of speech 
(GSA, 63-64 and elsewhere) are presented as the main distinctive characteristics of 
parrhesia.  Moreover, the parrhesiast’s lifestyle differs from the modes of existence of 
the seer, the prophet, the philosopher and the scientist. (GSA, 66 et seq.)  
 Having established the notion of parrhesia, Foucault, in his January 19, 1983 
lecture, embarks on a study of Euripides’ Ion, of which there is practically no trace in 
                                                 
4 See for instance Thomas Flynn, “Foucault as Parrhesiast. His last course at the Collège de France 
(1984),” Philosophy & Social Criticism, vol. 12, nos. 2-3 (July 1987), 213-229; Joseph J. Tanke, 
“Cynical aesthetics. A theme from Michel Foucault’s 1984 Lectures at the Collège de France,” 
Philosophy Today, vol. 46, no. 2 (Summer 2002), 170-184; Frédéric Gros (Éd.), Michel Foucault, Le 
Courage de la vérité (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2002); Nancy Luxon, “Ethics and 
subjectivity: practices of self-governance in the late lectures of Michel Foucault,” Political Theory, 
vol. 36, no. 3 (June 2008), 377-402; see also the online journal Parrhesia: www.parrhesiajournal.org. 
5 On parrhesia, see also Michel Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005), lectures of March 3, 10 and 17, 1982. 
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the rest of his work.  In this play, presented as a truth-telling tragedy, Ion is seeking 
his true parentage and wishes to return to Athens to exercise parrhesia, to obtain the 
right to speak, to tell everything and thereby to govern.  This mythical character has 
complex origins: his mother, Creusa, his legal father, Xuthus, a non-Athenian 
belonging to the monarchy, and Apollo, his real father.  Ion knows that the 
citizenship he has derived from Creusa and the inherited power of Xuthus are not 
sufficient to practise truth-telling and to govern.  Foucault clearly underlines this 
independence of parrhesia with respect to citizenship and inherited power: one can 
be a citizen and hold public position but not be able to govern properly, i.e. exercise 
parrhesia by denouncing the injustice suffered by the weak at the hands of the 
powerful.  Ion is confronted with another problem because the very practice of 
truth-telling itself is threatened.  Euripides is thus a first-hand witness to the decline 
of good parrhesia and the rise of bad parrhesia (self-interested speech, corruption, 
“false truth-telling,” etc.) in Athenian democracy.  Foucault discusses this alteration 
of frankness of speech in his February 2, 1983, lecture by constructing the “parrhesia 
rectangle” (rectangle constitutif de la parrhésia), which is composed of four elements, 
one for each of the cardinal points of the rectangle, each equally essential to the 
exercise of good parrhesia: democracy (formal condition), hierarchical games of 
power in an antagonistic society (condition of fact), truth-telling (condition of truth), 
and courage (moral condition).  In other words, for parrhesia to exist, there must be 
freedom of speech for all, recognition of the relationships of power between 
governors and the governed, the ability to distinguish truth from falsehood, and the 
presence of virtuous individuals ready to risk their status and even their lives in the 
name of truth.  After the death of Pericles, “false truth-telling” was probably 
responsible for the dismantling of the four elements of the rectangle, causing the 
decline of Athenian democracy.   
 In the session on February 9, 1983, Foucault moved away from Euripides to 
talk about parrhesia in the Platonic corpus.  Plato, in order to overcome the problems 
resulting from the growth of bad parrhesia, proposed to bestow governing power on 
the “Philosopher King.”  Visibly, the assignment of this right to the “moral high-
ranking city official” (“haut fonctionnaire moral de la cité”; GSA, 189) did not convince 
Foucault, who had already expressed his concern about the Platonic care of the self 
reserved for the elite and founded on ideal knowledge.6  He nevertheless grants 
Plato the great merit of putting good government of the self before the government 
of others, thus helping to make care of the self and truth-telling independent of 
political affairs.  There is thus a gradual path from the soul to City affairs: one must 
learn to behave properly oneself before governing others, to take care of oneself 
before speaking on behalf of all others, to better oneself before speaking the truth 
about laws and the constitution.  The dual Platonic heritage of parrhesia thus 
comprises a political side, where good management of the City is the ultimate 
                                                 
6 Michel Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, lecture of January 20, 1982 (first hour). 
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purpose of care of the self, and an ethical side, where care of the self is a value in 
itself. 
 Truth-telling in Athens became a perilous exercise, as the conviction of 
Socrates shows.  This was undoubtedly what incited Plato to go into exile by 
accepting the invitation of Dion of Syracuse to become an advisor to Dionysius the 
Younger, who had inherited political power from his father.  Plato’s political 
experience is abundantly discussed by Foucault, in particular using the Seventh 
Letter, in which Plato explains that before grasping the abstract truths linked to the 
common way of life, it is first necessary to strive to tell the truth about oneself, to 
improve oneself by practising concrete transformation exercises that Foucault 
associates with the “reality of philosophy” (GSA, 217-224), a reality that escaped 
Dionysius (GSA, 227) and which usually escapes tyrants in general.  Incidentally, at 
the beginning of GSA, Foucault addresses a similar reproach to the spiritual and 
political leaders who maintain humanity in a minority state by exercising tyranny 
without having first learned to improve their soul (GSA, 33), which can be construed 
as a self-criticism of his coverage of the Iranian revolution.  Foucault explains quite 
spectacularly the essentiality of practice of self in Plato’s dialogues, castigating 
Derrida one last time as he does so7 by underlining that Plato’s rejection of writing 
does not signify the advent of logocentrism but rather criticism of the simply 
theoretical knowledge of those called upon to govern. (GSA, 234-236) 
 In the lecture of March 2, 1983, Foucault presents the transformations of 
parrhesia in ancient Greece, from Euripides to Plato, summarizing what had been 
gained and achieved.  He lists a series of four shifts (GSA, 277-281): parrhesia is no 
longer linked only to democracy and becomes a key issue for all political regimes; 
univocal parrhesia becomes ambivalent (good and bad parrhesia); the single task of 
parrhesia that consists in governing others and speaking in the democratic public 
space now doubles with the inclusion of the aspect of government of the self; and, 
finally, parrhesia ceases to be a natural privilege granted to the few and now requires 
an education as it has become a cultural matter.  In the rest of the lecture, Foucault 
discusses the opposition between rhetorical speech and philosophical speech, 
elaborates on the subject of the diversion of parrhesia from its political function 
towards philosophical practice, and begins to study the connections between 
Socratism and Cynicism, which he explored in more detail the following year.  
 
The Courage of the Truth 
The first two lectures on CV again talk about the interpretation of parrhesia.  Foucault 
first states that articulation between modalities of veridiction, techniques of govern-
mentality, and practices of the self lies at the heart of all his work: “it is basically 
                                                 
7 For a brief presentation of the Foucault-Derrida debate, see Alain Beaulieu and Réal Fillion’s 
book review of Michel Foucault, History of Madness (London: Routledge, 2006), in Foucault Studies, 
Issue 5 (January 2008), section “Derrida and the Enlightenment.” 
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what I have always tried to do” (“c’est au fond ce que j’ai toujours essayé de faire”; CV, 
10), assertion of this interest for the correlation of knowledge, power and 
subjectivation echoing GSA (42, 285), where the relationship takes on ontological 
value.8  CV does introduce a new element, however, in situating parrhesia at the very 
heart of three ontological axes.  Foucault also returns to the styles of existence 
associated with truth-telling—those of the prophet, the wise man and the 
professor—in a slightly modified version from the one presented in GSA (66 et seq.) 
with the seer, the prophet, the philosopher and the scientist.  These different ways of 
being have corresponding techniques of veridiction distinct from parrhesiastic truth-
telling: unlike the prophet, the parrhesiast speaks on his own behalf and for the 
present; in contrast to the wise man, the parrhesiast remains active and does not seek 
to absent himself from the world in order to proclaim its ultimate truth; and, finally, 
the courage of the parrhesiast distinguishes him from the professor, who does not 
take any risks, which leads Foucault to ironize his own condition: “Everyone knows, 
especially me, that one does not need courage in order to teach” (“Tout le monde le 
sait, et moi le premier, que nul n’a besoin d’être courageux pour enseigner.” CV, 24).  Thus, 
the parrhesiast does not seek to evoke destiny in an enigmatic way (prophet), to 
determine how things should be in an apodictic way (wise man) or to present 
knowledge in a demonstrative way (professor); his field of intervention is otherwise 
because he acts on êthos; he seeks to transform the living environment.  Finally, the 
first few lectures of CV also talk about the crisis of legitimacy for parrhesia at the end 
of the fourth century and in the fifth century (CV, 34 et seq.) relating to the decline of 
Athenian democracy, which offered anyone and everyone the chance to say 
anything and everything they liked.  The rest of CV situates the attitudes of Socrates 
and the Cynics in the context of this parrhesia crisis.  More specifically, the later 
lectures of CV discuss the ways of linking care of the self (epimeleia heautou) to 
courage of truth (parrhesia) according to Socratic and Cynic principles.  
 The lectures of February 15 and 22, 1984 were devoted to Socrates—he whose 
courage to speak the truth eventually led to his death.  The Hermeneutics of the Subject 
devoted several developments to care of the self in Socrates.  In CV, Foucault 
innovates when he deplores the fact that very few commentators have proposed a 
valid interpretation of Socrates’ last words: “Crito, I owe a cock to Asclepius” 
(Phaedo, 118a). What meaning should be given to Socrates’ final words? In this 
hermeneutic work by Foucault—a moving work, also, when one considers that he 
died just a few months later—Socrates is presented  first not as a prophet, a wise 
man or a teacher, but as a parrhesiast, who sets himself the task of transforming 
êthos.  According to the Platonic interpretation, which still prevails, Socrates is a wise 
man who cultivates the immortality of the beautiful soul.  By offering a cock to the 
god of medicine and healing, Socrates wished to thank him for having finally cured 
his soul from the illness of being united with the body, which consolidates the major 
                                                 
8 See also Michel Foucault, Dits et écrits, vol. IV (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), 574-577, 618, 687, 813-814. 
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Platonic theme according to which the body is a prison for the soul.  The problem 
with this idealistic interpretation, says Foucault, is that there is no immanent trace of 
condemnation of life in the texts reporting Socrates’ thoughts.  Taking inspiration 
from Dumézil and from a passage in Phaedo (115b), where Socrates invites men to 
care for themselves, Foucault maintains that the illness from which Socrates is 
delivered is not the body inferior to the soul, but rather the absence of courage of 
truth, which is itself linked to the inability to change and better itself.  Thus, Socrates 
is not delivered from false theories in favour of a higher and nobler knowledge, but 
is freed from this theoretical quest by having managed to privilege his practical 
action, his êthos.  This interpretation does not stop Foucault from considering the 
Socratic enterprise, and the parrhesiastic one in general, as highly spiritual.  In fact, 
in an interview in January 1984, Foucault actually defined spirituality as an 
enterprise of self-transformation: “By spirituality I mean *<+ the subject’s attainment 
of a certain mode of being and the transformations that the subject must carry out on 
itself to attain this mode of being.  I believe that spirituality and philosophy were 
identical or nearly identical in ancient spirituality.”9  
 The subsequent lectures were devoted for the most part to analysis of the 
Cynic way of life, which is also viewed as a spiritual and tangible self-trans-
formation coupled with courageous practice of the truth.  One senses in these pages, 
admirable for their considerable philosophical fervour, an approval and even a 
certain respect for the Cynics’ way of life, which goes beyond affinity with Socrates. 
After all, as Foucault reminds us, Socrates’ day ended peacefully in the comfort of 
his own home, with his wife by his side... The Cynic way of life is more radical, the 
Cynic parrhesiast demonstrating his courage at all times as well as a frankness that 
is scandalous vis-à-vis others and dangerous to himself, stripping himself of all 
superfluous material goods, living on the edge of society like a stray animal with no 
fixed abode, being more preoccupied with transforming attitudes and ways of being 
than with acquiring theoretical knowledge.  The Cynic person is the greatest 
awakener of ethical conscience, he for whom veridiction is demonstrated the most 
directly in his being, Foucault even going so far as consecrating it “universal 
missionary of humankind” (“missionnaire universel du genre humain”) and 
“functionary of humanity” (“fonctionnaire de l’humanité” – with a passing glance 
toward Husserl10) associated with the “government of the universe” (“gouverne-
ment de l’univers”; CV, 277-278).  
 Quite rightly, Foucault points out that Cynicism has been the subject of very 
few studies (CV, 164), the philosophical institution maintaining a certain ambiguity 
(CV, 163) with respect to a lifestyle that could nonetheless be considered a paradigm 
                                                 
9 Michel Foucault, in Foucault Live, edited by Sylvère Lotringer (New York: Semiotext(e),1996), 
443. 
10 Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (Evanston, 
Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1970), §7.  
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of philosophical experience.  Foucault fills this gap in part by speculating, among 
other things and in an instructive way, on the “transhistorical” character (CV, 161) of 
Cynicism, the continuation of which he sees in certain Christian spiritual movements 
that encourage poverty, wandering and begging (CV, 168), in terrorist acts that are a 
scandalous way of telling the truth combined with a self-transformation leading to 
death—but this courageous fanaticism is also qualified as “delirious” (CV, 170-
171)—, in certain nineteenth-century left-wing revolutionary movements (CV, 171-
172), as well as in modern art from the end of the eighteenth century, which saw the 
beginning of a rupture between the marginalized artist and his time (CV, 171-173).  
 Foucault presents cynicism as giving a new meaning to the Platonic theme of 
“true life” (“vie vraie”; alêthês bios).  For Plato, true life is a life that is pure, ideal, 
unitary and unmixed.  Cynic parrhesia practises the art of transparency well by 
seeking to hide nothing and to tell everything without fearing the consequences, but 
it redefines the parameters of this transparency.  It is in relation to true life that 
Foucault proposes to interpret the message received in Delphi by Diogenes of 
Sinope: “deface the currency.” (CV, 208 et seq.)  This prophecy calls for the adoption 
of a critical stance toward standards, laws and conventions.  For Foucault, currency 
becomes synonymous with the “true life” that the Cynics push to the limit by 
cultivating the art of paradox.  But the attitude of the Cynic is contradictory only in 
appearance because it is simply reflecting true life in a broken mirror (CV, 214), 
which sends the philosophers back a deformed and shameful image of themselves, 
their task and their existence.  
 Pages 215 and 216 insightfully recapitulate the work accomplished since GSA 
by identifying three types of courage of truth: in its political form, courage of truth 
tells the Assembly (Euripides’ Ion) and the Prince (Plato in Sicily) what the Assembly 
and the Prince do not want to hear, as the Socratic courage of truth risks suffering 
the attacks of those who do not want to know that they know nothing, while the 
Cynic courage of truth is not happy just to speak in order to change attitudes, but 
rather provokes scandal by sending back a concrete image (beggar bag, rags, 
unkempt beard, tubs, etc.) whose principles are accepted theoretically (demon-
strating simplicity to improve what is essential), although their corresponding action 
and truth-telling become intolerable (refusal of daily practices and conventions 
leading to insults).  Is Foucault right to affirm that Spinoza was the last philosopher 
concerned with true life, that the search for true life was neglected in the last few 
centuries, somewhat like Heidegger’s presentation of Being as having been forgotten 
(CV, 217-218)?  If so, Foucault sets himself the task of bringing philosophy back to its 
basic functions: “true life” does not reside only in the transformation of individual 
attitudes with a view to making an “other life” happen;  it is also necessary to push 
this transformation until an “other world” emerges (CV, 226-228), which is not, 
Foucault adds, an “other world” transcending this one, but another state of this 
world. (CV, 288 note)  That one of the teachings found by Foucault in ancient 
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thought consists in taking care of the self in so far as changing the world through 
“spiritual combat” (CV, 257) led “in this world against the world” (CV, 310) and 
which “must bring about a change in the entire world” (CV, 264; my translations) is 
somewhat surprising if one considers that ancient criticism of the universal 
intellectual established in the name of the specific intellectual seemed to neutralize 
utopian forces.11  In reality, however, this quest for the “other world” is part of a 
much wider plan—despite being presented in a fragmented and piecemeal manner 
in Foucault’s texts—that aims to reform the utopian tradition.  A passage in Birth of 
Biopolitics12 follows a similar line of thought by calling for the creation of liberal 
utopias whose environment favours minority practices.  Such an environment could 
fall into the category of “other spaces” or of “heterotopias.”13 
 The last lecture of CV outlines what could have been studied the following 
year and which would have consisted, for example, in showing how the Cynic 
“missionary of the truth” bridges the gap between the Socratic heritage and certain 
practices of Christian asceticism, in analyzing the way in which true life gives access 
to another world in Christianity, and in examining Christian parrhesia understood 
not as courageous and risky truth-telling addressed to men, but rather as a spoken 
commitment of the soul to God.   
 
Conclusion 
GSA and CV are the only lectures that establish links with all periods of the history 
of Western thinking: with Christian asceticism extending the Cynic tradition of 
truth-telling by placing it under the banner of confession and felicity (GSA, 330-331; 
CV, 166-169, 228, 289-310), with the modern philosophy of Descartes, Leibniz, Kant 
and Hegel, which Foucault accuses of having broken away from the concrete 
practices of transformation of the self (GSA, 318; CV 218)—however Kant is once 
again put on a pedestal since Foucault shares his interest in the revolution (GSA, 10-
38) and salutes his eclecticism which holds private and public truth-telling together 
(GSA, 270)—and, finally, with several contemporary philosophers whose names 
Foucault does not mention, though he does take a stance on the performative 
utterances (énoncés performatifs) of Austin and Searle (GSA, p. 59 et seq.), on 
Derrida’s deconstruction (GSA, 234-236), and in a less decisive way on the illocutory 
force (force allocutoire) of Austin, Searle and Habermas (GSA, 322), as well as on 
Heidegger’s Being. (CV, 218)  Nietzsche, especially his criticism of the “true world” 
                                                 
11 Michel Foucault, Dits et écrits (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), vol. II, 308 and vol. III, 109. 
12 Michel Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), March 21, 1979 
lecture. Foucault said he would return to these thoughts but never did. See also Alain Beaulieu, 
“Towards a Liberal Utopia. The Connection Between Foucault’s Reporting on the Iranian 
Revolution and the Ethical Turn,” Philosophy & Social Criticism, vol. 36 (2010; in press). 
13 Michel Foucault, Dits et écrits, vol. IV (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), 752-762. See also: Michel 
Foucault,   Le corps utopique – Les Hétérotopies, présentation de Daniel Defert (Paris: Lignes, 2009).  
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and his invitation to abandon the quest for the “what” to concentrate on “who,” 
transpires in each page of GSA and CV where Foucault exposes a “theatralization” 
and a “dramatization” (GSA, 66; CV 234) of frankness of speech that less concerns 
the Subject than the ways of stylizing the existence, less the Truth than the ways of 
telling it.  
 But from a historical point of view, it is primarily Greek thought that interests 
Foucault.  In fact, he often questions and provokes the Hellenists, bemoaning that in 
two thousand years no commentary has successfully managed to interpret Socrates’ 
last words (CV, 67-68, 112), underlining also the conspicuous lack of studies relating 
to the history of Cynicism. (CV, 164)  Furthermore, it remains to be seen if the theme 
of parrhesia, which is also little studied (GSA, 45), really is one of the keys to 
interpreting and understanding how Greek culture evolved.  Foucault believes it is 
and convinces us of this, stating that “up to a certain point” (jusqu’à un certain point; 
GSA, 177) parrhesia can be used as an interpretive lens for seven centuries of ancient 
thought.  But what about the Hellenistic studies that hitherto considered parrhesia as 
a marginal, satellite theme?  A reader of GSA and CV does not get the impression 
that Foucault over-interprets the texts.  On the contrary, at each lecture we see him 
patiently commenting on the Greek texts, comparing the terms with the accepted 
translations, tirelessly seeking the meaning of the words.  The Hellenists’ reactions 
to GSA and CV are as expected.14  One can imagine that some specialists of 
Antiquity will protest in order to defend their property, while others will welcome 
these final works of Foucault that open new avenues for reflection.   
 All these discussions of the history of ideas must not allow us to forget, 
however, that Foucault’s aim in writing these lectures was an eminently practical 
one: to help change attitudes and modify the state of the world in such a way as to 
encourage transformation of the self and of others.  To achieve this, Foucault attacks 
the problem in a way that suits the limits of his duties as professor by proposing, as 
he often does (GSA, 321-322; CV, 195-196, 262), a new way of envisaging the history 
of philosophy that is not an analysis of how doctrines are forgotten or progress, but 
a study of practices of veridiction and styles of existence.   
                                                 
14 Some works from Hellenists commented on Foucault’s relationship to Antiquity; see for 
instance: Pierre Hadot, “Reflections on the Notion of 'The Cultivation of the Self,” in Timothy J. 
Armstrong (ed.) Michel Foucault: philosopher (New York: Routledge, 1992), 225-232; David H.J. 
Larmour, Paul Allan Miller and Charles Platter (eds.), Rethinking Sexuality: Foucault and Classical 
Antiquity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998); Wolfgang Detel, Foucault and Classical 
Antiquity: Power, Ethics and Knowledge, edited by Robert B. Pippin, translated by David Wigg-Wolf 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Paul Allen Miller, Postmodern Spiritual Practices: 
The Construction of the Subject and the Reception of Plato in Lacan, Derrida, and Foucault (Columbus, 
Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 2007). However, none of these commentaries analyses in depth 
all of Foucault’s works on antiquity, including GSA and CV. 
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 Thus Foucault’s aim is not simply practical but also concerns “the present”: 
GSA and CV participate in a “history of the present” by questioning the limits of our 
own democracies as places deficient in true discourse.  In so doing, Foucault’s last 
lectures engage in an underground dialogue with the liberal thought explained in 
Security, Territory, Population and Birth of Biopolitics.  Freedom of speech must not 
open the door, as is most often the case, to a festival of opinions that do not change 
anything, but to a truth-telling that provokes and transforms, starting with the 
exercise of frankness of speech.  Foucauldian democracy does not therefore make 
tolerance its main goal, but rather encourages a certain form of public intolerance 
situated in a continuation of the Kantian heritage. (GSA, 36) 
 GSA and CV contain a rich network of thoughts that, hopefully, can be 
integrated into future ethical and political debates.  They also provide several useful 
elements in helping to understand Foucault's work internally by continuing certain 
previous meditations concerning in particular Foucault’s relationship to the 
Enlightenment, revolution, spirituality, ontology and utopian tradition.  Perhaps for 
the first time Foucault elucidates so clearly a figure of resistance to the techniques of 
domination; the Cynic parrhesiast, universal missionary of human kind, becomes 
the absolute outside of mechanisms of subjectivation (asujettissement).  Mastering the 
art of government of the self, this king of derision acts on the manoeuvring of 
knowledge/power so that he is in a position to denounce scandalously in order to 
encourage alternatives to the government of others.  This is why certain passages of 
GSA and CV can give the impression that Foucault is taking a step backward, that he 
is returning to a pre-disciplinary stage where the parrhesiast and his universal 
humanism would become sovereign.  But this regression is only apparent if we 
consider the fact that knowledge is secondary to the changes of êthos for the 
parrhesiast who, moreover, remains indifferent to the power of domination (potestas) 
in order to privilege the capacities for transformation (potentia).  
 
Palgrave-Macmillan is aiming to publish the English translation of GSA (Government 
of Self and Others) in Spring 2010, and CV (The Courage of the Truth) in Spring 2011. 
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